In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for reducing the k-item n-bidder auction with additive valuation to k-item 1-bidder auctions. This approach, called the Best-Guess reduction, can be applied to address several central questions in optimal revenue auction theory such as the power of randomization, and Bayesian versus dominant-strategy implementations. First, when the items have independent valuation distributions, we present a deterministic mechanism called Deterministic Best-Guess that yields at least a constant fraction of the optimal revenue by any randomized mechanism. Second, if all the nk valuation random variables are independent, the optimal revenue achievable in dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) is shown to be at least a constant fraction of that achievable in Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC). Third, when all the nk values are identically distributed according to a common one-dimensional distribution F , the optimal revenue is shown to be expressible in the closed form Θ(k(r + mr 0 (1 − F (x) n ) dx)) where r = sup x≥0 x(1 − F (x) n ) and m = ⌈k/n⌉; this revenue is achievable by a simple mechanism called 2nd-Price Bundling. All our results apply to arbitrary distributions, regular or irregular.
Introduction
Consider the multiple items auction problem, in which a seller wants to sell k items to n bidders who have private values for these items, drawn from some possibly correlated probability distributions. We are interested in studying incentive compatible mechanisms under which the bidders are incentivized to report their values truthfully. One major question is how to design such mechanisms which can maximize the expected revenue for the seller.
The single-item case (k = 1) was resolved by Myerson's classic work [25] when the bidders' values for the item are independently distributed. The general multiple-item case (k > 1) is provably harder (e.g., [13] [14] ), and has in recent years been intensively studied in the literature. In particular, when the inputs are discrete, much progress has been made on the efficient computation of the optimal revenue (e.g., [6] [7] [8] [9] ). Another direction is to design simple mechanisms for approximating optimal revenues in various settings (e.g., [10] [11] [21] [27]). However, there remain important aspects of the multiple-item auction that are not well understood. Most of the known results put restrictions on the distributions (e.g., [4] [8] [9] ). Also, the computational methods proposed typically find the optimal revenue by solving some mathematical programming problems, which do not yield mathematical formulas for the optimal revenue (or its approximation), even for relatively simple input distributions. To name some intriguing open questions: Is it possible to express the optimal revenue in terms of the valuation distributions elegantly, can the optimal revenue be achieved by some simple mechanism, and is the requirement of dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DIC) much more stringent than Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC)?
In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for reducing k-item n-bidder auctions with additive valuations to k-item 1-bidder auctions. This approach, called the Best-Guess reduction, can be applied to address some of the above central questions in optimal revenue auction theory regarding the power of randomization, and Bayesian versus dominant-strategy. First, when the items have independent valuation distributions, we present a deterministic mechanism called Deterministic Best-Guess that yields at least a constant fraction of the best randomized mechanism. Second, if all the nk valuation random variables are independent, the optimal revenue achievable in dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) is at least a constant fraction of that achievable in Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC). Third, when all the nk values are identically distributed according to a common one-dimensional distribution F , the optimal revenue can be expressed in the closed form Θ(k(r + mr 0
(1 − F (x) n ) dx)) where r = sup x≥0 x(1 − F (x) n ) and m = ⌈k/n⌉; this revenue is achievable by a simple mechanism called 2nd-Price Bundling. All our results apply to arbitrary distributions, regular or irregular.
Related Work: The reduction of mechanism design from an n-bidder multi-item auction to 1-bidder multi-item auction was considered in Alaei [1] with a different approach, which did not yield constant factor approximation in the DSIC model (except under restrictions such as 'budget-balanced cross monotonicity'; see also [2] ). Recently, Hart and Nisan [18] started a line of research (see [3] [16] [19] [22] [29] ) for studying simple mechanisms for 1-bidder k-item auctions with provable performance bounds for arbitrary distributions; some of these results will be needed in our paper. The question of how much randomization helps in auction mechanism design has been studied in a variety of models (e.g., [5] [12] [20] ). In some situations, such as in the 1-bidder case (Babaioff et al. [3] ) and in the n-bidder unit-demand setting (Chawla et al. [12] ), it is known that randomized mechanisms can yield at most a constant factor over deterministic mechanisms. The question of how much more revenue BIC implementation can yield over DSIC has a large literature (e.g., Gershkov et al. [15] , Manelli and Vincent [24] ). For the one-dimensional models (i.e. k = 1), starting with Myerson's classical work, strict equivalence between BIC and DSIC has been established in various contexts. It is widely agreed that strict equivalence is false for the multi-dimensional settings, but how much revenue can BIC yield over DSIC is largely unknown.
Preliminaries

Basic Concepts
Let F be a multi-dimensional distribution on [0, ∞)
nk . Consider the k-item n-buyer auction problem where the valuation n × k matrix x = (x j i ) is drawn from F . Buyer i has
as his valuations of the k items. For convenience, let x −i denote the valuations of all buyers except buyer i; that is,
denotes the probability that item j is allocated to buyer i when x = (x j i ) is reported to M by the buyers. We require that n i=1 q j i (x) ≤ 1 for all j, so that the total probability of allocating item j is at most 1. M also specifies a payment s i (x) ∈ (−∞, ∞) for buyer i. A mechanism is called dominant-strategy individually rational (DSIR) if for each i and x, k j=1 x j i q j i (x)−s i (x) ≥ 0, i.e., a buyer gets at least as much in (reported) value as he pays for. A mechanism is called dominantstrategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if for every i,
That is, buyer i does not gain any more utility by mis-reporting x i as x ′ i , given that all other buyers maintain their reported valuations. We also consider a weaker version of rationality and incentive compatibility that is widely adopted. A mechanism is called Bayesian individual rational (BIR) if each buyer i gets at least as much value as he pays for in the average sense, when all other buyers report truthfully. More precisely, BIR requires that for every i and
be the total payments received by the seller. For any mechanism M on F , let s M (F ) = E x∼F (s(x)) be the (expected) revenue received by the seller from all buyers. The optimal revenue is defined as REV (F ) = sup M s M (F ) when M ranges over all the DSIR and DSIC mechanisms. Similarly, in the Bayesian model, the optimal revenue is defined as REV Bayesian (F ) = sup M s M (F ) when M ranges over all the BIR and BIC mechanisms. A mechanism is said to be deterministic if all q j i (z) ∈ {0, 1}. Let DREV (F ) denote the sup of revenue over all deterministic DSIR-DSIC mechanisms for distribution F .
One well-known DSIR and DSIC mechanism is the Vickrey 2nd-price mechanism [30] applied to each item. That is, for each item j, the seller awards the item to the highest bidder (with any specified tie-breaking rule) on this item but at the 2nd highest bid price. Let X = (X j i ) be the random variable matrix distributed according to F . Let X j[2nd] be the 2nd largest of X j i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
. Then the revenue of this Vickrey 2nd-price mechanism M vr is E x∼F (X [2nd] ), and hence
That is, B(X −i ) is the maximum bid among all buyers except buyer i. (Remark : We sometimes write lower case x for the random variable X when there is no confusion, or write X F to emphasize its relationship with F .)
β-Exclusive Mechanisms and the β-Bundling
In this subsection we restrict ourselves to 1-buyer k-item auctions. In this case DSIR=BIR and DSIC=BIC, and we can simply call them IR, IC. For 1-bidder k-item auctions, we introduce a concept called β-exclusive mechanisms which will be central to our reduction method. Let L be any distribution
that is, an item j with bid equal to or below the threshold β j will not be allocated to the
) over all β-exclusive IR-IC mechanisms M, and we refer to REV X (L, β) as the optimal β-exclusive revenue for L.
As an example, the familiar concept of Myerson's reserve price for each item may be viewed as a special case of β-exclusion. Also, any mechanism M can be easily converted into a 0-exclusive mechanism with the same revenue by setting q j (z) to 0 whenever z j = 0.
We introduce the following β-exclusive mechanism, called β-Bundling. This mechanism will be useful in providing a deterministic implementation of our reduction in Theorem 3. (We remark that bundling is a widely studied mechanism with many interesting variants, see e.g. [17] [23] [26] [28] .) First consider, for any β ∈ [0, ∞) k and w ≥ 0, the mechanism M β,w with allocation q and payment s, defined as follows:
Use M β,w (L) to denote its revenue E z∼L (s(z)). (The parameter w may be regarded as an additional surcharge that the mechanism imposes on any bundle.)
We use Bund(L, β) to denote the revenue of the β-Bundling mechanism for L.
Lemma 2.1. The β-Bundling for L is a deterministic IR-IC mechanism.
Proof. Immediate from the definition.
It will be shown in Section 6 (Theorem
, the best revenue achievable by any β-exclusive mechanism.
Main Results
We start by considering the 1-bidder k-item auction. Let L be any distribution over [0, ∞) k , and β a vector from [0, ∞)
k . To provide a good benchmark for REV X (L, β), we define below an adjusted revenue for any general IR-IC mechanism M (not necessarily β-exclusive), where the portion of M's revenue from allocating low-value items (relative to β) is effectively discounted. 
) over all IR-IC mechanisms M, and we refer to REV A (L, β) as the optimal β-adjusted revenue for L .
Note that, if M is a β-exclusive mechanism, then its β-adjusted revenue is equivalent to its normal revenue. Our first theorem compares the optimal β-exclusive revenue REV X (L, β) with the optimal β-adjusted revenue REV A (L, β); this result will play a crucial role in our n-bidder to 1-bidder reduction.
We now propose a reduction called Best-Guess for the n-bidder k-item auction F . Under this reduction, only the top bidder for each item may get the item. The seller performs n separate 1-buyer auctions as follows: In the auction for bidder i, the seller uses a β-exclusive mechanism to enforce the top-bid constraint, where β = B(x −i ), i.e., β j = max{x
Best-Guess Reduction for distribution F Given the n × k bid matrix x = (x j i ) distributed according to F , the seller conducts with each bidder i a 1-bidder k-item auction with x i = (x j i |1 ≤ j ≤ k) as the bid; the seller uses an IR-IC revenue-optimal B(x −i )-exclusive mechanism with respect to the distribution x i ∼ X i |x −i .
It is clear that the Best-Guess Reduction is indeed a valid mechanism (i.e., with each item getting total allocation ≤ 1) that is DSIR and DSIC. We will use BGR(F ) to denote its expected total revenue. In actually implementing Best-Guess, we may employ a B(x −i )-exclusive mechanism that is α-approximate for each buyer i (rather than a truly optimal mechanism), that is, one that yields at least 1/α of the the optimal B(x −i )-exclusive mechanism's revenue. We refer to this modified version of Best-Guess as α-approximate Best-Guess. The resulting mechanism (by choosing any α-approximate mechanism for each buyer i) is clearly DSIR-DSIC; we call it a BGR α -mechanism and denote 3 its revenue by BGR α (F ). In particular, when α = 1, we have BGR 1 (F ) = BGR(F ), the revenue of the Best-Guess Reduction itself.
Note that BGR(F ) may not always yield good revenue; for example, BGR(F ) = 0 when all valuations x j i are equal to a constant c. However, by simply taking the better of BGR(F ) and E x∼F (X [2nd] ) (which is the revenue of the 2nd-price Vickrey mechanism), one can show that a constant fraction of REV (F ) is guaranteed when the items are independent.
Theorem 2. The Best-Guess Reduction is a DSIR-DSIC mechanism. Furthermore, for any
REV (F ).
Theorem 2 says that, when REV (F ) is much larger (say 9 times more) than what the Vickrey 2nd-price can produce, Best-Guess Reduction can extract the revenue more effectively. Also note that BG(F ) is realizable by the mechanism formally defined as follows:
) then use the Best-Guess Reduction;
) then use Vickrey 2nd-price mechanism.
The following Corollary generalizes Theorem 2 to the α-approximate version of Best-Guess.
Corollary. The revenue BGR α (F ) of any α-approximate mechanism satisfies max{BGR α (F ), E(X
Theorem 2 corresponds to the α = 1 case of the Corollary. The revenue max{BGR α (F ), E(X [2nd] F )} can be realized, as before, by a Mechanism BGR α which identifies with the better (for distribution F ) between a given BGR α -mechanism and the Vickrey 2nd-price mechanism.
Deterministic Best-Guess Reduction (DBGR) for distribution F Given the n × k bid matrix x = (x j i ), the seller conducts with each bidder i a 1-bidder k-item auction with x i = (x j i |1 ≤ j ≤ k) as the bid; the seller uses the β-Bundling mechanism for distribution L, where β = B(x −i ) and L is defined by X i |x −i .
From Theorem 3 and Corollary to Theorem 2, we have max{DBGR(F ), E(X
REV (F ). In other words, the following deterministic mechanism can realize revenue 1 69
REV (F ):
Mechanism DBG:
) then use the Deterministic Best-Guess Reduction;
) then use a deterministic Vickrey 2nd-price mechanism.
Turning next to a different question, we show that, if all the nk value distributions are independent (though not necessarily identical), then the optimal revenues are equivalent, up to constant factor, for the Bayesian and the dominant strategy settings.
If all the nk value distributions are independent and identical, we can obtain a formula in closed-form. We propose a new mechanism, called Second-Price Bundling (SPB), as a heuristic for approximating DBGR. Let a parameter w ≥ 0 be first chosen.
Second-Price Bundling (SPB) with parameter w
The SPB mechanism picks for each item a maximum bidder (breaking ties using the uniform random rule); let J i be the set of items for which bidder i is the selected maximum bidder. For each i, the seller makes a take-orleave offer for all the items in J i (as one bundle) to bidder i, at the price
In this scheme, the parameter w serves as a surcharge on top of the second price to enhance the revenue. SPB can be regarded as a simplified version of DBGR, in which the Bundling mechanisms applied to different bidders have a common, fixed surcharge w. For any F , let SP B(F ) be the maximum revenue that can be generated by any mechanism in the SPB family (that is, over all possible choices of parameter w). In the 1-bidder case, bundling is known [22] to yield at least a constant fraction of the optimal revenue for iid items. Theorem 5 shows that, for n bidders, SP B similarly achieves a constant fraction of the optimal revenue when all the nk valuation random variables are iid according to a common one-dimensional distribution F . We denote such a valuation distribution F by F n⊗k .
an IR-IC mechanism for any chosen parameter value w, and SP B(F ) = Θ(REV (F )).
We remark that the constants in the Θ notations in Theorems 5 are universal constants, i.e., independent of n, k, and F . We will prove Theorems 1-5 in Sections 4-9. In addition to the above main results, Theorems 5.3, 6.1, 7.1 and 9.1 may also be of some independent interest. The Appendix contains the proofs of some auxiliary lemmas left out of the main text.
Theorem 1: Effect of β-Exclusion
In this section we prove Theorem
For any real number α, let Y j α be the random variable obtained as follows: with probability ξ j , generate
Proof. Let M be any IR-IC mechanism with allocation q and payment s. We construct mechanism M ′ with allocation q ′ and payment s ′ defined by: for any z in the support of Y u and any j, let
It is easy to verify that M ′ is u-exclusive, IR-IC, and
, and hence Lemma 4.1.
Proof. Clearly, with γ = (0, · · · , 0) we have
We will prove Lemma 4.2 in two steps:
Step 1. Prove that there exists u ∈ [0,
For
Step 1, we let G (0) = L, and construct a sequence u 1 , u 2 · · · inductively by choosing u j to maximize the value of 
Eq. 1 now follows from Eq. 2. This finishes Step 1.
For
Step 2, take an IR-IC mechanism M (with allocation q and payment s) achieving
. By Lemma 4.1, we can take M to be u-exclusive.
Consider a new mechanism M ′ with allocation q ′ and payment
, where z is defined by z j = max{z ′j , u j }. It is straightforward to verify that M ′ is IR, IC and satisfies
, and finishes Step 2. The proof of Lemma 4.2 is now complete.
Proof. Take an IR-IC mechanism M with allocation q and payment s achieving E z∼L
. By Lemma 4.1 and the fact L + β = Y β , we can take M to be β-exclusive, and satisfying
Now consider mechanism M ′ with allocation q ′ and payment s ′ defined by:
It is easy to check that M ′ is β-exclusive, IR-IC, and
(s(z)), and hence by Eq. 3
This proves Lemma 4.3.
It follows from Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 that, to establish Theorem 1, it suffices to prove
to which we will devote the rest of this section.
Let M, with allocation q and payment s, be an IR-IC mechanism achieving optimal revenue for distribution L − β . It is well known (see [18] ) that, without loss of generality we can assume M to have the NPT (no-positive-transfer) property, i.e., s(z) ≥ 0 for all z. Furthermore, we can without loss of generality assume that M is γ-exclusive where γ = (0, · · · , 0), i.e., q j (z) = 0 whenever z j = 0. (Otherwise, we can simply set q j (z) to 0 whenever z j = 0.) We will construct a new mechanism M ′ which, for distribution L + β , has β-adjusted revenue on a par
The multi-set {(q(z), s(z)) | z ∈ D} can be considered as a menu for M, so that the bidder with valuation z can choose an entry (q * , s * ) from this set to maximize the utility q * z − s * .
To construct M ′ , we modify this menu by deleting some entries and then lowering the payment for all remaining entries. Let a > 1 and 0 < b < 1 be two parameters satisfying b > 1 a . A value z ∈ D is said to be profitable if
where as usual βq(z) = k j=1 β j q j (z). Let D 0 ⊆ D be the set of all profitable values. We construct for M ′ the following menu:
where we denote the closure of a set S ⊆ R k+1 by S. Note that γ ∈ D 0 , and hence M ′ has an entry (q(γ), bs(γ)) = (0, 0) to ensure the IR property.
By definition of menu, the allocation q ′ and payment s ′ for M ′ are determined as follows:
is at least a fraction of the payment from the natural candidate entry (q(z), bs(z)) in M ′ . (We remark that the lowering of the payment in M ′ plays a crucial role in ensuring this property.) Let us define
Clearly, 0 < c < 1.
Proof. Suppose the lemma is false. Then there must exist in M ′ an entry (q(u), b s(u)) with u ∈ D 0 such that:
where
We derive a contradiction.
It follows from Eqs. 8, 10 that
Note that as M is IR and IC,
From Eq. 9,
By Eq. 12 and the fact u ∈ D 0 , we have then
contradicting Eq. 11. This proves Lemma 4.4.
Using Lemma 4.4, and the fact that s ′ (z ′ , β) ≥ 0 (see Eq. 10) for all z ′ , we obtain
Since
It follows from Eqs. 13 and 14 that
This proves
Hence
Taking a = 4, b = , we obtain
But the term
An Upper Bound for Revenue
It is of interest to compare BG(F ) with the revenue achieved by using a relaxed version of the Best-Guess Reduction (BGR). Suppose in the description of BGR, one were to drop the requirement of B(x −i )-exclusive mechanisms, but use any general mechanism with optimal B(x −i )-adjusted revenue (while everything else is kept the same). The resulting revenue, denoted by BG A (F ) is defined formally as follows.
Theorem 5.1 shows that the quantity BG A (F ) provides a useful upper bound to REV (F ) for arbitrary distribution F . In the next subsection we will show that this bound is tight when the items are independent. 
).
The rest of this subsection will be devoted to proving Theorem 5.1. It is obvious that both BGR and Mechanism BG are DSIR-DSIC mechanisms for solving the auction problem, and hence BG(F ) ≤ REV (F ). It remains to prove the upper bound
). Consider any mechanism M with allocation q j i and payment s i . We will prove that its revenue satisfies
which is sufficient to establish the desired upper bound in Theorem 5.1. For each x and buyer i, let β = B(x −i ) and define
Then, noting that
This implies
Fix i, x −i , and consider the induced IR-IC mechanism M' (for 1-bidder k-item auction) which, for bid x i ∈ [0, ∞) k , allocates q j i (x i , x −i ) for item j and gets payment s i (x i , x −i ). By Eq. 16 and the definition of REV A , we have
Inequality 15 follows immediately from Eqs. 17 and 18. This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Optimality of Best-Guess
When the items have independent valuation distributions, i.e. F = F 1 × F 2 × · · · × F k , we show that the upper and lower bounds in Theorem 5.1 differ by at most a constant factor.
Proof. Observe that by definition of the Best-Guess Reduction, we have
To prove Theorem 5.2, we need to express BG A (F ) in similar form and compare it with Eq. 19. By definition,
Applying Theorem 1 with L = X i |x −i , β = B(x −i ), and using Eq. 19, we obtain
and Theorem 5.2 is proved.
By Theorems 5.1 and 5.2, we obtain
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
The Corollary to Theorem 2 can be proved in a similar way. We modify Theorem 5.2 to read (and easily verifiable)
and Eq. 20 then becomes
proving the Corollary.
Theorem 5.3. Let SREV (F ) be the revenue obtained by selling each item separately and optimally. If
for some universal constant c > 0.
Proof of Theorem 5.3 is done by using the Best-Guess Reduction and applying the c log 2 (k+1) -approximation result from [22] for the 1-bidder SREV , and will be omitted here. [27] where such a bound was derived for the case k = 1, in [18] for the case k = 2, and in [3] for the situation when all nk valuation distributions are independent. Our result only requires that the items have independent distributions.
Theorem 5.3 strengthens results in
Deterministic Best-Guess Reduction
Before proving Theorem 3, we first establish some useful facts about 1-buyer k-item auctions. For any distribution L over (−∞, ∞) and c ∈ (−∞, ∞), let L−c denote the distribution obtained from L by shifting the origin from 0 to c. That is, P r z∼L−c {z > y} = P r z∼L {z > y + c} for all y.
k . The next lemma relates the optimal revenue achievable by β-exclusive mechanisms to that achievable by general mechanisms (without the β-exclusive restriction). Let
Proof. Given in the Appendix.
We will use a recent result from Babaioff et al. [3] . Let SREV (L) and BREV (L) be the optimal revenue by selling separately and Grand Bundling, respectively.
Lemma 6.2. ([3]) For any
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 3. It is obvious that DBGR is a deterministic DSIR-DSIC mechanism. We will show that DBGR is a BGR α -mechanism for α = 8.5; that is, β-Bundling is an α-approximation to the ideal optimal β-exclusive mechanism.
Proof. By Lemma 6.1,
It is easily seen that
For the other term in Eq. 21, by Lemma 6.2, there exists w ∈ [0, ∞) such that
Similar to Eq. 22, for any ǫ > 0, there exists β ≥ β such that Bund(L, β) . Thus, taking the limit ǫ → 0, we obtain
Also, it is clear that
which implies that
With help of Eqs. 24 and 25, we obtain from Eq. 23
It follows from Eqs. 21, 22 and 26 that
This proves Theorem 6.1.
Theorem 3 follows immediately from the Corollary to Theorem 2 (with α = 8.5) and Theorem 6.1.
A General Implementation of Best-Guess Reduction
The DBG Mechanism studied in Section 6 is one special way of implementing the Best-Guess Reduction. In this section we show that any 1-buyer k-item mechanism M with approximation ratio 1 α for the revenue can be transformed into an 1-buyer k-item β-exclusive mechanism M ′ yielding at least
of REV X (L, β); then, combined with Corollary to Theorem 2, it gives an n-buyer k-item mechanism with approximation ratio . Viewed in this light, the DBG Mechanism can be regarded as the special case where M is the mechanism studied in [3] . 
(ii) let Φ β,2 (M) be the 1-buyer k-item mechanism M ′ with allocation q ′ and payment s ′ defined by: for any z
For α ≥ 1, we say that a mechanism M is an α-approximate
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that, for i = 1 and 2, Φ β,i (M) is IR, IC, and β-exclusive. It immediately follows that Φ β (M) is also. The proof of the last part of the theorem generalizes the proof of Theorem 6.1. By Lemma 6.1,
Let
To bound the other term in Eq. 27, note that as M is α-approximate for L
Let M have allocation q and payment s, and M 1 have allocation q ′ and payment s ′ . Then by definition of M 1 = Φ β,1 (M) and M ′ , we have from Eq. 29
It follows from Eqs. 27, 28 and 30 that
This proves Theorem 7.1.
Bayesian vs. Dominant Strategy Revenue
We prove Theorem 4 in this section. We first establish an analogous result to Theorem 5.1 For the Bayesian setting of incentive compatibility, under the assumption of valuation independence among the bidders. Recall that SREV (F ) is the revenue obtained by selling each item separately and optimally.
Proof. Consider an optimal BIR-BIC mechanism M for F with allocation q j i (x), payment s i (x) from buyer i and hence total payment s(x) = n i=1 s i (x). Our goal is to show that
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, consider the following 1-buyer k-item mechanism M i for buyer i. For any valuation
, where x −i is distributed according to F −i , the product of F i ′ for all i ′ = i. We first note an important property of M i .
Property P1. M i is IR and IC: for any
. This property follows directly from the fact that M is BIR and BIC.
We are now ready to analyze the performance of M in comparison with BG A (F ), where by definition
) is the value of the maximum of {x
Given any valuation (x j i ), we define for each i, I i (x) = {j| x j i ≤ B j (x −i )}, and
Lemma 8.1.
Proof. By Property P1 and definition of REV A , we have for each i, x −i ,
The lemma now follows from Eq. 32.
Relabel x i as z i , and we have
For convenience, we define
where we have used the fact that 
which completes the proof of Theorem 4.
Optimal Revenue in I.D.D. Case
We will prove Theorem 5 in this section. We first give some notations and lemmas.
The proof of Property P2 is given in the Appendix. The following lemma from Li and Yao [22] will also be useful.
In the rest of this section, for any distribution F on [0, ∞), we reserve the symbolsF to denote the distribution defined byF (x) = (F (x) ) n , and m to denote ⌈k/n⌉. We can restate Theorem 5(a) as follows:
In this section, for convenience we allow the value distributions to have support on (−∞, ∞)
All the terms such as mechanisms, IR, IC, REV, etc. are defined exactly as previously.
. Let Y be a random variable distributed according to L. Let p = P r{Y > 0}, and let Z be the conditional distribution Y | (Y > 0).
Proof. Obviously, we can assume p > 0. For any I ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , k}, z ∈ [0, ∞) k , let I = {1, · · · , k} − I, z I = (y i |i ∈ I) and z I = (y i |i ∈ I). Let M be any IR-IC mechanism for L, with allocation q and payment s. We show that
Fix any I ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , k}, z I ∈ (−∞, 0] |I| . We construct a mechanism M ′ for valuation z I ∈ (0, ∞) |I| , with allocation q ′ and payment s ′ defined as follows. Let
Note that s ′ (z I ) ≥ s(z I , z I ). It is straightforward to check that M ′ is IR and IC. By definition of REV , we have
For a random z ∈ L, let I denote the random variable corresponding to the set {j| z j > 0}. Then
This proves Eq. 37 and hence Lemma 9.2.
We will prove the upper and lower bounds of Theorem 5 in the next two subsections, respectively.
Revenue Upper bound
In this subsection we prove the upper bound in Theorem 5, i.e., showing that for distributions of the form F = F n⊗k ,
To directly use the upper bound technique developed in Section 5 for the current purpose is possible, but it involves lengthy calculations. Instead, we will use a variant of Theorem 5.1. Let F be any distribution over [0, ∞) nk for the n-buyer k-item auction. First, as a counterpart of BG A (F ), we define below F X β (F ), which is a version of adjusted revenue but with a fixed adjustment β for all bidders (rather than using B(x −i )-adjusted revenue for bidder i, as in Definition 5.1).
Definition 9.2. For any fixed
Proof. The proof follows from the same outline as the proof of Theorem 5.1 (but simpler), and will be omitted.
We next consider some simple properties of the distributionsF (x) and H F (x) where
is an increasing function of z, and one can easily verify that b(1/n) ≥ 1/e. Thus, HF (x 0 −) ≥ b(1/n) ≥ 1/e. This shows
Without loss of generality, one can assume H F (x 0 ) = 0. Otherwise, REV (F ) ≤ kx 0 and hence Eq. 38 is already satisfied due to Eq. 39. Let F 0 denote the distribution F conditioned on x > x 0 :
, where β j = x 0 for all j. By definition,
Let i ∈ {1, · · · , n} be fixed, and let p = H F (x 0 ) ≤ 1/n. Lemma 9.2 implies that
where we have used the elementary fact REV ((
. By Lemma 9.1, we have REV (F ⊗ℓ 0 ) ≤ c ℓA ℓ (F 0 ) for some constant c > 0. This leads to
Eqs. 40 and 41 give an upper bound to F X β (F ) in terms of A ℓ (F 0 ). To derive Eq. 38, we only need to relate A ℓ (F 0 ) to A m (F ).
A m (F ) where c ′′ = e + e ln(2e).
The proofs of Properties P3 and P4 are given in the Appendix. Using Properties P3 and P4, we obtain from Eqs. 40 and 41 that
By Theorem 9.1, REV (F ) ≤ F X β (F ) + β . As β = kx 0 ≤ k e rF ≤ k e A m (F ) by Eq. 39, this together with Eq. 47 implies Eq. 42, completing the upper abound proof of Theorem 5.
Optimality of Second-Price Bundling
In this subsection, we prove that SPB is IR-IC and
Clearly SPB is IR, as it makes only take-or-leave offers. We show that SPB is also IC. Let We next show that for some properly chosen w (dependent on F only), SPB can achieve an expected revenue of at least Ω(kA m (F )). We will choose the parameter w as follows.
}. In this case, by simply setting w = 0, the SPB has exactly the same effect as selling each item separately with Vickrey's 2nd-price payment, yielding a revenue
}. In this case, pick some u such that uHF (u) ≥ 4 5 rF . Define
}, and define w 0 = u/2 if mq 0 ≤ 1 and w 0 = ⌊q 0 m⌋u/2 if mq 0 > 1. Choose the parameter w to be
Lemma 9.3. In Case 2, with the parameter w as defined in Eq. 44, SPB can achieve expected revenue at least Ω(kA m (F )).
The proof of Lemma 9.3 is given in the Appendix. Thus Eq. 43 is valid for all F (either Case 1 or Case 2). This completes the proof of Theorem 5.
for all z ∈ [0, ∞) k . It is straightforward to verify that M ′′ is IR and IC. It follows that
Facts 1-3 imply immediately Eq. A1. This proves Lemma 6.1.
Note 2: Proof of Property P2
It is easy to see that
, we thus obtain 0 ≤ A ℓ (F ) − (r F + C ℓ (F )) ≤ r F , and it follows that
This proves Property P2.
Note 3: Proof of Property P3
By definition, A ℓ (F 0 ) = r 0 + ℓr 0
To estimate ξ, we use Stirling's approximation to obtain
where β 3 is the constant ℓ≥1 e ln ℓ 2 ℓ−1 . Property P3 follows from Eqs. A4, A5.
Note 4: Proof of Property P4
We first derive a simple relation between HF and H, where H stands for H F . 
n ≥ nH(x)/e. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that (1 − z) n − 1 + nz is non-negative over z ∈ [0, 1] by taking derivatives. This immediately leads to nH(x) ≥ HF (x) by letting z = H(x).
Let H 0 (x) stand for H F 0 (x) = 1 − F 0 (x), and r 0 stand for r F 0 . By definition, H 0 (x) = 1 p H(x) for x ≥ x 0 , where p = H(x 0 ). It follows from pn ≤ 1 and Fact 4 that, for
HF (x); and these inequalities are easily checked to be true actually for all x. This immediately implies
If kp ≤ 1, then h = 1, and
satisfying Property P5. We can thus assume kp > 1. In this case from A6
Hence, from A6-A7 we have
From Eqs. A6 and A8, we obtain
This proves Property P4.
Note 5: Proof of Lemma 9.3
We first cite two earlier results from references [18] and [22] . mqt.
We also need the following estimate on a certain type of probability arising in our analysis. 
We will show that
which together with Eq. A9 implies b n,k ≥ 1 14 , hence proving Fact 7. We can assume k/n to be non-integral; otherwise b n,k = b Thus, to prove Eq. A11 it suffices to show
This is equivalent to proving n(1 − 1/n) ≤ 6(k − m + 1)/m, that is, (n − 1)m ≤ 6(k − m + 1), or (n + 5)m ≤ 6(k + 1).
But Eq. A12 is easy to prove: using the inequality n + 5k/n ≤ 5k + 1 for n < k, we have (n + 5)m = (n + 5)⌈k/n⌉ ≤ (n + 5)( k n + 1) = n + 5k n + k + 5 ≤ 6(k + 1).
This proves Eq. A11, hence the proof of Fact 7 is complete.
We now proceed to prove Lemma 9.3. The proof is accomplished through a series of Facts. Recall that m = ⌈ k n ⌉, and it is assumed that E(V F ) < 1 5 max{rF , C m (F ) 80 }. 
Recall that we have chosen the parameter w as defined in Eq. 49 of the main text. mD m (F ).
Proof. We consider two separate cases.
Case A. C m (F ) ≥ 80 rF .
We have w = Case B. C m (F ) < 80rF .
We first derive some useful information (Eq. A17 below). In Case B, we have from Eq. A13 This implies
We are now ready to analyze wP m (w) for Case B. Apply Fact 6 with Z j = W j − V j and t = . Hence the proof of Lemma 9.3 is complete.
